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Mind Slaughter: The Neutralizations
of Jihadi Salafism
SIMON COTTEE
School of Social Sciences
Bangor University
Bangor, Gwynedd, Wales, UK
This article focuses on the neutralizations of the jihadi Salafi ideology. It is divided into
three parts. The first describes the various rhetorical accounts that ordinary people
use to neutralize conventional moral controls against inhumane conduct. The second
traces how these accounts inform and drive the jihadi Salafi worldview. The third, and
concluding, part of the article sketches out the policy implications of the analysis set out
here, arguing that any attempt to derail the global Salafi jihad must critically undermine
the core neutralizations of the jihadi Salafi ideology, since it is these which enable jihadi
combatants to escape conventional moral constraints and perpetrate acts of inhumanity.
Introduction: How, Not Why
This article is not concerned with the “root” or underlying causes of terrorist activity.
That is, it does not wish to examine the complex of motivations and emotions that prompt
people to engage in terrorism: not because it thinks that the motivations and emotions that
animate terrorist actions are unimportant or uninteresting—quite the contrary—but because
its concerns lie elsewhere: in, specifically, how or in what ways people enable themselves,
by means of various rhetorical accounts, to engage in acts of terrorism. Thus this article
primarily focuses on the social activity of account-making: on how people publicly explain
their actions, the actions of others, and the world around them. Accounts are “out there,”1
so to speak, and can be readily identified in the pronouncements and thinking of those
who make them. They can be seen at work and are amenable to sociological analysis.2
This article, in particular, is concerned to look at the rhetorical accounts embedded in the
jihadi Salafi worldview—at the range of symbolic resources that enable jihadi combatants
to perform acts of extreme violence.
Contrary to the common assumption that terrorists are “mindless,”3 terrorist actors4
are in fact characteristically self-reflective, and invest great energy into constructing their
violence as legitimate or morally imperative. Whatever it is that causes people to engage
in terrorism, the intention to kill and maim for political purposes is chosen, and the choice
itself is strongly informed by moral arguments and reasons, however misconceived or
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hallucinatory. One of the central contentions of this article is that, wherever the causes of
terrorism may ultimately lie, the act of killing, maiming, and terrorizing innocent people
is enabled by a framework of justifying and mitigating narratives. These narratives exist,
and are often supported, in the wider cultures in which terrorists live. Without recourse to
them, terrorists would be greatly stymied, unable to neutralize or deflect the full weight
of civilized morality bearing down on them. This is not to downgrade, still less to deny,
the causal centrality of motives and the emotions in the etiology of terrorist activity. The
point, rather, is that in order to commit terrorist acts, terrorists must act upon their motive
or desire to carry them out, and that in acting upon their motive or desire to engage in
terrorist activity they must neutralize the moral constraints on doing evil or inhumane acts.5
Understanding how they try to do this is therefore an important part of the wider causal
picture of terrorist behavior.
Using the work of the social psychologist Albert Bandura, the aim in what follows will
be to describe the various justifying and mitigating narratives that people use to overcome
moral controls. The article shall then try to show how these narratives inform, or are at
work in, the ideology of jihadi Salafism.
Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
Drawing on a wide range of sources from a variety of disciplines,6 Bandura describes the
mechanisms, psychological and social, by which ordinary and typically law-abiding people
can bring themselves, or be brought by others, to commit inhumane acts.7
Bandura’s analysis is based on the following assumptions: that in the course of social-
ization “people adopt moral standards that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct”;8 that
they apply these standards to how they act and punish themselves when they fail to live up
to them; and that the application of moral standards and hence the exercise of self-sanctions
is a selective process and depends on how the agent construes the circumstances in which
they find themselves. Bandura’s central contention is that certain mechanisms exist that
serve to temporarily prize or, in Bandura’s phrase, disengage internal moral control from
destructive behavior, thus facilitating agents to commit acts that they would otherwise find
reprehensible. Specifically, internal moral control can be disengaged by, variously, “recon-
struing conduct as serving moral purposes, by obscuring personal agency in detrimental
activities, by disregarding or misrepresenting the injurious consequences of one’s actions,
or by blaming and dehumanizing the victims.”9 Bandura’s main concern is to describe
these various “psychosocial mechanisms of moral disengagement” and to analyze how
they “operate in the execution of inhumanities.”
Moral Justification
One of the most powerful mechanisms for disengaging moral control is cognitive recon-
strual: if agents can convince themselves that their inhumane or destructive actions are
morally right or imperative, they can perform them without moral inhibition; indeed they
may even come to view their actions with unrepentant self-satisfaction and pride. Through
moral sanction of violent means people are able to
see themselves as fighting ruthless oppressors who have an unquenchable ap-
petite for conquest, protecting their cherished values and way of life, preserv-
ing world peace, saving humanity from subjugation to an evil ideology, and



























reprehensible and destructive conduct has been perpetrated by ordinary, decent
people in the name of religious principles, righteous ideologies, and nationalis-
tic imperatives. Throughout history, countless people have suffered at the hands
of self-righteous crusaders bent on stamping out what they consider evil.10
Stamping out criminality and vice in particular has served as an especially potent pretext
for consigning countless numbers to their graves. By portraying people as guilty of some
terrible deed, killing them can be accomplished without remorse and their deaths can be
framed as an act of justice, not murder.
The idea that killing is legitimate—an act of necessity or justice—not only enables
combatants to kill without remorse, but can also engender a kind of blood-lust, where the
killing becomes a truly joyous and pleasurable experience. “I really loved fucking killing,
couldn’t get enough” is how one Vietnam soldier put it, reflecting on how the desire for
avenging the deaths of his fallen comrades had transformed him.11 This, presumably, is
what the novelist Martin Amis has in mind when he refers to the “irresistible combination
of rectitude and violence.”12 Once infused with righteousness, violence can be enjoyed and
knows no limits. Corruptio optimi pessima: no greater cruelty will be devised than by those
who are sure, or are assured, that they are doing good.
Denial of Personal Agency
Responsibility for inhumanities can either be “displaced” or “diffused.” Regarding the
former, agents view their actions as “springing from the dictates of authorities rather than
from their own violation,” and are thus “spared self-prohibiting reactions.”13 Nazi prison
governors and their staffs, for example, could feel relatively serene about their murderous
actions, since they were simply “obeying orders,” and were thus not personally responsible
for the deaths of innocents.14 The participants in the My Lai massacre similarly claimed
that they were “only” doing what they had been told, and thus did not experience feelings of
guilt.15 Lieutenant William L. Calley, the archetypal “ordinary executioner” (short, podgy,
middle-class) wrote in his autobiographical account of the massacre, Body Count, that
“personally, I didn’t kill any Vietnamese that day: I mean personally. I represented the
United States of America. My country.”16 Another Vietnam veteran reflected that he had
done a few things he “shouldn’t have. . . . But as I sit here I say I never did anythin’ wrong
other than obey my country’s orders. I never did anythin’ bad personally.”17
Regarding the “diffusion” of responsibility, agents can readily perpetrate inhumanities
if they come to believe that their own personal contribution is negligible or only partially
related to the eventual outcome. Acts of inhumanity are consequently far more likely to
occur in a group context, since in groups no single person feels responsible for what hap-
pens. When everyone is responsible, no one is really responsible. Large bureaucracies are
especially hospitable environments for perpetrating inhumanities, since the tasks performed
by their members are subdivided and in themselves seem harmless. Functionaries shift their
attention from the meaning of what they are doing to the details of their specific jobs.18
Disregard or Distortion of Consequences
If the human costs of destructive behavior can be avoided, minimized, or disbelieved,
moral control can be disengaged easily. For example: killing at a distance is much easier
than at close range, since the terror and suffering of the victim cannot be seen or heard.



























military history, and writes that soldiers feel a “profound revulsion” toward its “intimate
brutality.”19 Of deliberate “knife kills,” Grossman observes that they are nearly always
carried out from behind, precisely because “the face and all its messages and contortions
are not seen.”20 This, too, explains why the victims of executions and beheadings are nearly
always blindfolded or hooded.
The mechanized weapons systems of contemporary warfare dramatically enhance the
possibilities for inhumanities, since they enable killing at a vast physical distance. The
howling, the severed limbs, and the stench of excrement and blood: all of this can remain
reassuringly abstract in the mind of the twenty-first-century soldier. Joanna Bourke writes
of a “strong correlation between altitude and guilt,” and reports that in World War II B-
52 pilots and crews were “less liable to experience remorse than men on fighter-bomber
missions who, in turn, were less guilt-ridden than men flying helicopter gunships where the
victims were clearly visible.”21 This perhaps explains how the navigator of the Enola Gay,
which dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, could feel not the slightest ghost of a regret
for his role in incinerating thousands upon thousands of innocents: he recalled that after
the mission he “had a bite and a few beers, and hit the sack,” and claimed to have lost not
a single night’s sleep over his actions.22 J. Douglas Harvey, another World War II bomber
pilot, similarly testified to a lack of guilt, since he “could not visualize the horrible deaths
my bombs had caused.”23
Conversely, when people can see and hear the suffering they cause, they usually shud-
der and feel a sense of revulsion and the sting of shame. Studies of obedient aggression24
strongly support this observation: when the victim’s pain becomes more evident and per-
sonalized, people are less willing to follow the injurious commands of the authority figure.
In addition to avoiding the harmful consequences of their actions, agents may either
deny the factual existence of the harm (“this didn’t happen,” “this isn’t credible”) or,
having acknowledged its existence, minimize it (“you’re exaggerating,” “it’s not as bad as
you say”).
Dehumanizing and Blaming the Victim
The last disengagement mechanism described by Bandura works on the targets of inhumane
acts. If someone is perceived as less than human, the scope of what can coercively be done
to them expands tremendously. Once dehumanized, a person is no longer a recognizable
human agent, but an object or thing without feelings, hopes, and concerns; they are mindless
“savages,” “gooks,” “satanic fiends,” “cockroaches,” “vermin.”25 Thus transformed, they
can be brutalized and killed without self-reproach or shame; indeed, “exterminating” them
can be seen as a moral duty. By contrast, “people strongly disapprove of punitive actions
and rarely excuse them when they are directed at persons depicted in humanized terms.”26
Another way in which the violent can immunize themselves against self-reproof is by
reversing the roles of perpetrator and victim.27 By viewing themselves as the injured party
and the victim as the “true” aggressor, the perpetrator can reframe their violent actions
as rightful retaliation or punishment. Violence can be reconceptualized as “justice.” Or,
perpetrators can insist that they were “provoked,” and that the victim “pushed” or “drove”
them to act. This last possibility is less a justification than an excuse, since the perpetrator
does not claim that they were “in the right”; rather, their rhetorical efforts are directed at
denying culpability—they “are not to blame.”28
As can be seen from the above summary, mechanisms of moral disengagement work
by denying not the legitimacy of moral norms, but rather their applicability to particular



























I never raped her”; “yes, it’s coercive, but it isn’t torture”;29 “yes, I killed them, but
it wasn’t terrorism.” Thus mechanisms of moral disengagement operate by rhetorically
recategorizing agent-misbehavior, not by disputing the legitimacy of the very rules that
the misbehavior transgresses. Once the moral wrongdoing in question is recategorized as
something other than it is—once, say, the killing of Jews is not classified as murder30 or
the temporary drowning of terror suspects is not classified as torture—then these activities
can be performed freely, without moral inhibition.
The aim in what now follows will be to identify a number of moral disengagement
mechanisms or, to use the terminology of Sykes and Matza, “neutralizations” in the jihadi
Salafi ideology. However, before embarking on this task it will be necessary to outline, in
ideal-typical terms, the key ideas, assumptions and motifs on which the jihadi Salafi outlook
draws. This outline, being an outline, is by no means exhaustive, and is correspondingly
selective in its discussion of various views and thinkers.
The Jihadi Salafi Ideology: An Overview
Of all the varieties of Islamism, Salafism is one of the most extreme, embracing a strikingly
puritanical moral and political vision.31 To speak very approximately, there are two factions
within the Salafi community: the non-violent Salafis, who strongly reject the use of violence
as an instrument for change, and the jihadi Salafis, who insist that violence is a legitimate
tactic in the current social and political context in which the Muslim world finds itself. In
other words, jihadi Salafis are part of a faction within a faction, which in turn is marked by
deep divisions, especially over the question of violence (that is, when and against whom it
can be legitimately used). Since the aim of this article is to illuminate, however partially, the
enabling conditions of the current wave of jihadist violence against “the West,” spearheaded
by Al Qaeda, the ideas and doctrines considered here are those espoused by the ultraviolent
elements in the jihadi Salafi movement, and cannot be taken as representative of the views
of all jihadi Salafis.
The term “Salafi” is used to denote those who rigorously follow the example of the
companions (salaf) of the Prophet Mohammed. As followers of the companions, Salafis
believe that they are preserving the “true” meaning of Islam against what they see as the
impurities and corruptions of subsequent religious practice. From the Salafi perspective,
Truth lies in the original sources of Islam (the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the hadiths), and any
interpretations that deviate from the original sources are rejected as distortions that lead
away from the path of God.
In outlook Salafis are totalist, in that they believe that Islam is a complete code of
life, and envisage no sphere of human activity independent from its scope. They are also
fundamentalist, in that they believe that Islam is the literal word of God and cannot therefore
be questioned or revised in any way.
As well as being totalist and fundamentalist, Salafism is also morally absolutist, in
that its adherents think that the Islam of the original sources embodies deep moral truths
about how people ought to live their lives. Salifis believe that there is only one Truth, that
that Truth is reflected in Islam, and that all other alternative moral approaches to life are
seriously wrong or confused.
Salafism is thus fundamentally, unappeasably, and self-consciously opposed to the
political ideals of Western liberalism. Not only does it reject the Millean idea of the
“private sphere,” where individuals are free to think and act as they wish (so long as they
inflict no direct material harm on others); it also repudiates the secular ideal of a public



























liberal ideal of skeptical inquiry, according to which “truth” is never final but is contested,
dialectical, and constantly revisable in the light of empirical evidence and the free exchange
of conflicting ideas.
Salafis are also vehemently opposed to the liberal politics of compromise and the
connected idea that progressive change can be achieved through reforming existing political
institutions. Indeed, they are radically and defiantly utopian, in that their avowed ambition
is to break completely and totally with existing practices and to reestablish the order of the
Prophet’s early community.
Writing of the new global jihadi groups, Ahmed Rashid observes that they lack a
clearly defined political vision and are completely disengaged from practical politics. They
show little interest in “transforming a corrupt society into a just one,” in “providing jobs,
education, or social benefits to their followers,” or in “creating harmony between the various
ethnic groups that inhabit many Muslim countries.”32 Furthermore, he writes, they “have no
economic manifesto, no plan for better governance and the building of political institutions,
and no blueprint for creating democratic participation in the decision-making process of
their future Islamic states.”33 Bruce Lawrence, referring to Al Qaeda, similarly remarks that
although it “denounces a host of evils” wholly absent from its vision is “any social program”
or clearly specified “alternative conception of the ideal society.”34 This failure to engage in
practical politics and to develop viable policies reflects not an absence of imagination on
the part of the jihadis, but rather the strength of their revolutionary utopianism.
What is distinctive about the jihadi wing of Salafism is its fusion of the aforementioned
elements with an ethos of murderous violence—an ethos, to repeat, vehemently rejected by
the Salafi mainstream. Although jihadi Salafis by definition are committed to the notion of
waging a violent jihad in defense of Islam, there has been intense dispute among key figures
within the movement over a number of crucial questions related to the nature and scope of
this violent jihad. When is it right to fight? Are Muslim rulers a legitimate target for violent
attack? Is it permissible to deliberately kill civilians? Are suicide missions—so-called
‘martyrdom operations’—a legitimate tactic in the defense of Islam? The ultraviolent jihadi
Salafis respond to these questions broadly as follows: (1) violence is perfectly legitimate if
it is in response to aggression;35 (2) Muslim rulers are a legitimate target for attack if it can
be shown that they are responsible for implementing non-Islamic laws or have lent their
support to the crusader enemies of Islam; (3) the deliberate killing of “infidel” civilians is
legitimate if it is undertaken for the purposes of revenge and is justly proportionate or if it
can be shown that the infidels in question support (either explicitly or tacitly) those who
wage war on Muslims; (4) the “martyrdom operation” is a legitimate weapon of self-defense
against infidel aggressors. Quintan Wiktorowicz, in a brilliantly incisive discussion of these
jihadi positions,36 insists that they are recent ideological innovations, and says that together
they represent a dramatic erosion of the traditional Islamic constraints upon warfare and
violence. Indeed, so dramatic has this erosion been that Martin Amis is exaggerating only
slightly when he says of the jihadi ideology that “no armed doctrine in history has availed
itself of a vaster target—anything and anyone.”37 Only non-combatant Muslims enjoy full
immunity from deliberate jihadi violence,38 although jihadis, as already mentioned, apply
a notoriously broad definition of combat.39
There is also a strain within the jihadi Salafi movement that not only justifies but en-
thusiastically celebrates the use of violence against an ever-expanding category of enemies,
and which takes sadistic pleasure from the act of killing itself. For these particular jihadists,
the aim is not just to destroy the enemy, but to torment and degrade it. Walter Laqueur
describes this as the “barbarization of terrorism,” and by way of illustration refers to the



























too quickly.40 The jihadi Salafis are certainly not the only terrorists to have perpetrated
acts of barbaric savagery, but, as Laqueur observes, its members seem especially prone to
them.
Historically, the roots of the jihadi Salafi movement lie in the merger between the
radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Wahhabi sect in Saudi Arabia.
Intellectually, the movement’s ideology is a hectic amalgam of disparate elements,41 and
selectively draws on the writings of, among others, Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad
bin Abdul Wahhab, Mawlana Abul A’la Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and Mohammed al-Faraj.
Its outlook is also shaped by a (decidedly secular42) constellation of impulses, beliefs, and
prejudices, among them: a virulent anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism; a mythic idea of
the Afghan jihad; a narrative of Muslim victimization at the hands of the West; and the
ancient doctrine of the lex talionis (the principle of “an eye for an eye”).
The figure of Sayyid Qutb casts an especially long shadow over the jihadi Salafi imag-
ination, and although Qutb is reviled among many Salafi scholars his general sociological
vision, or way of understanding the world, has been broadly taken up by many of the jihadi
groups.43 Qutb’s outlook is often described (and derided) as “Manichean” and “reductive.”
It is not difficult to see why. For Qutb, the world is divided into two houses: the House
of Islam (Da¯r al-Isla¯m), in which Muslim governments rule, and the House of War (Da¯r
al-Harb), the rest of the world, inhabited and ruled by infidels. Qutb’s central argument is
that something has gone deeply wrong in the House of Islam: not only has it lost its global
dominance; it has become enfeebled, corrupt, and permissive. Qutb’s explanation for this
is rooted in his analysis of the marginalization of Islam in the contemporary Muslim world.
By embracing the secular creeds of socialism and nationalism, Muslim leaders had effec-
tively renounced the supreme sovereignty of Allah, and thereby condemned their societies
to failure and ruin. Or so Qutb thought.
In developing this account, Qutb invoked the deeply resonant Islamic term jahiliyya,
which was classically applied to the period of paganism that existed in Arabia before the
advent of the Prophet, and refers to ignorance, or defiance, of God’s absolute sovereignty.
According to Qutb, the contemporary Muslim world, like that of pre-Mohammedan Arabia,
is in a state of jahiliyya: a state of spiritual and societal disarray. Jahiliyya, though, is most
acute in the West, which Qutb saw as, in the words of Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit,
“a gigantic brothel, steeped in animal lust, greed, and selfishness,”44 and where God’s
sovereignty had been thoroughly usurped by lowly men.
Despite his sizeable contempt for the non-Islamic world, especially America,45 Qutb
was most scathing about the governments of the Muslim world, which, in his view, were
guilty of apostasy, of being falsely Islamic. Qutb’s scorn was directed in particular at the
government of the country from which he came, Egypt, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser.46
Qutb was adamant: Nasser’s pan-Arabist regime, despite professing Islamic credentials,
was in fact an enemy of Islam and had to be overthrown and replaced by an authentically
Islamic polity. Qutb was active in plotting the regime’s downfall, although the revolution
he envisaged never materialized.
Having identified the problem of jahiliyya in the contemporary Muslim world, Qutb
offered a solution. “Modernizing” Muslims, he said, are categorically wrong. The troubles
of the Muslim world, he explained, are the result not of insufficient modernization but, on
the contrary, of a modernization process gone too far and divorced from Islamic laws and
customs. In their efforts to adapt to modernity, Muslim governments had adopted foreign
laws and customs, and thereby chose to jettison core Islamic principles. For Qutb, it was
that disregard for, or casual indifference toward, God’s law that had consigned Muslims to



























Only by restoring Islam to the center of their lives could Muslims hope to recapture their
rightful place as the dominant culture in the world.47 But, Qutb warned, the path to Allah
is by no means straightforward, and is imperiled by both external and internal threats. On
one side are the “infidels,” who seek to exploit and seduce48 the believers for their own
ends. And on the other are the false, “apostate” Muslims, who, by embracing Western ideas
and philosophies, seek to corrupt the Islamic world from the inside. For Qutb, peaceful
coexistence or compromise with these enemies is impossible, since their ambition, which
Qutb believed they were close to achieving, is the destruction of Islam. “Those who have
usurped the power of God on earth,” Qutb wrote, “will not be dispossessed by dint of word
alone.”49 There was no alternative: the “usurpers” had to be fought, and it was obligatory
for all Muslims, who were able, to fight them. At the forefront of that fight would be an
elite group of Holy warriors—a Muslim vanguard: an armed resistance movement whose
purpose is to defeat the enemies of Islam and restore the Muslim world to its rightful place
as a dominant imperial power.
These themes and ideas are defining and emblematic of the jihadi Salafi worldview, in
which one can easily intuit Qutb’s Manichaean division between the righteous Muslims on
the one side and the world of unbelief and impurity on the other, as well as his view that the
‘unbelievers’, led by the Americans and the Jews (the ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance’), are the
source of all evil, and are deliberately plotting to corrupt and conquer the world of Islam.
Qutb’s insistence that armed force is the only means by which the Muslim world can hope
to save itself from ruin is also deeply embedded in the jihadi Salafi worldview.
Another major source of influence on the jihadi Salafi outlook is Mohammed al-Faraj.
Following Qutb, Faraj sought to argue that it is entirely legitimate to overthrow Muslim
rulers who do not properly apply the Sharia. In The Neglected Duty, published and first
circulated in Cairo in the early 1980s,50 Faraj trenchantly rejected the idea that jihad should
be understood primarily as a nonviolent spiritual struggle for Islamic purity, and instead
emphasized its meaning as armed warfare. He also argued, no less trenchantly, that violent
jihad in defense of Islam is an obligatory duty for all Muslims, and that this jihad should
be initially waged against the false “apostate” Muslim rulers who deviate from, or fail to
fully implement, Islamic law:
The basis of the existence of imperialism in the lands of Islam is these self-same
rulers. To begin with the struggle against imperialism is a work which is neither
glorious nor useful, and it is only a waste of time. It is our duty to concentrate
on our Islamic cause, and that is the establishment first of all of God’s law in
our own country and causing the word of God to prevail. There is no doubt that
the first battlefield of the jihad is the extirpation of these infidel leaderships and
their replacement by a perfect Islamic order. . .51
Faraj’s prioritizing of the internal jihad was informed by his view that without apostates,
external enemies are essentially powerless and can be repelled with ease.52 Faraj also
believed that the internal jihad was a necessary precondition for a wider offensive jihad
against unbelief everywhere.
Although the jihadi Salafi movement was incubated in the concentration camps of
Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s,53 it was not until after the Afghan jihad against the Soviet
Union that it emerged as a serious global political force.54 What the jihad against the Soviets
did was to bring together, from all over the globe, a group of jihadis and give them not only
invaluable expertise in guerilla warfare but also a powerful sense, emotional and ideological,



























in the jihadis a profound sense of invincibility: shortly after its defeat in Afghanistan
the Soviet Union collapsed. This tremendously emboldened the jihadis, who believed,
erroneously, that they, with God’s blessing, had single-handedly brought down the godless
Soviet empire. This belief in turn engendered and fortified the notion that if the Soviets
could be destroyed, then so too could the other remaining godless superpower, America.56
Of those who fought the Soviets, a small group remained in Afghanistan and was
co-opted by bin Laden into what was to become Al Qaeda.57 Already battled-hardened and
accomplished ideological killers, bin Laden’s role was to mobilize and lead them for the
coming jihad, of which they would be the leading vanguard, against America.
Bin Laden’s decision to launch the jihad against America, first announced in 1996,
reflected a major shift in tactical thinking, in that the direct target for military attack had
switched from the “near enemy”—the incumbent Muslim regimes against whom Qutb and
Faraj had sought to incite violence—to the “far enemy”—the United States and its allies.58
Although controversial among his fellow jihadis, some of whom doubted not only its moral
legitimacy but also its tactical wisdom, the rationale behind the new strategy was clear, as
Stephen Holmes explains: “By attacking US interests, [Al Qaeda] hoped to force the United
States to withdraw its troops from the Gulf and its support for Mubarak, just as attacks in
Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993 had driven the Americans to pull out their troops.
To overthrow both Mubarak and the House of Saud, the Americans must be induced to
abandon their clients. The most effective way to undermine the near enemy was to attack
the distant enemy.”59
In discussing the contemporary jihadist ideology, many commentators and pundits
are liable to impose upon it the weight of an entrenched monolith, proclaiming that its
“tentacles ” are spread “far and wide ”. Or else they compare it to an infectious disease,
identifying where in the social body outbreaks are likely to occur and how best to immunize
against them. Neither of these metaphors is especially helpful, since, as suggested earlier,
not only does the jihadi Salafi ideology remain a marginal strand within the broad spectrum
of Islamism; it is also often actively sought out and taken up by those who come to embrace
it. However, it is by no means overstating matters to say that its reach is now properly
global, and that, though not infectious, it clearly strikes a resonant chord among a large
and increasing number of Muslims from a diversity of backgrounds. Having outlined the
animating ideas and concerns of this ideology, the article will now focus on how it serves
to neutralize moral controls, thus clearing the path for inhumanities.
The Neutralizations of the Jihadi Salafi Ideology
Moral Justification: Self-Defense and Retaliation
The jihadi Salafi outlook, as shown thus far, actively embraces, and in some cases glorifies,
the use of lethal violence against non-Muslim (“infidel”) civilians. Behind this embrace are
two distinct justifications, each with a different philosophical grounding.
The first holds that the Muslim world is under grave assault from both foreign
invaders— “crusaders”60 —and corrupt Muslim leaders—“apostates,” “unbelievers,” or
“false Muslims.” This is from bin Laden’s 1998 public statement:
Never since God made it, created its desert, and encircled it with seas has the
Arabian Peninsula been invaded by such forces as the crusader armies that have



























riches. All this is happening at a time when nations are attacking Muslims like
leeches.61
Bin Laden identifies the following as instances of clear, outright aggression on the part of the
crusaders against the Ummah: (1) the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, “the most
sacred of the Islamic lands”; (2) the visiting of terrible, indeed genocidal, devastation on the
Iraqi people, by means of the American-sponsored and enforced United Nations sanctions-
regime; and (3) opulent U.S. patronage of the state of Israel, and hence direct collusion
with the infidel occupation of Jerusalem and the oppression and murder of Palestinians.62
So grave is the assault on Islam—bin Laden, following Qutb, believes that Islam “as a
creed” is on the brink of “extermination”63—that the use of violence to repel the combined
infidel and apostate aggressors is an urgent necessity. The time for dialogue has long passed,
although dialogue is in any case pointless, since the aggressors are inherently untrustworthy
and violence is the only language they are capable of understanding.64 The use of violence,
then, is a practical imperative: the only means by which the very survival of Islam as a
religion, way of life, and identity can be assured; and the deliberate use of violence against
infidel civilians in particular can be justified, since it is the only effective weapon available
to the defenders of Islam.65 As Ayman al-Zawahiri says of the perpetrators of the 9/11
attacks, they did it “because they were forced to defend their community and their sacred
religion from centuries of aggression” and “had no means other than suicide attacks to
defend themselves.”66 This justification is utilitarian in character, as it proclaims that the
end (the survival of Islam and the Islamic world) justifies the means (the suicidal mass
murder of civilians). In postulating that a sufficiently worthy goal can justify the use of
utterly reprehensible tactics, it is salutary to note that jihadi Salafis are using the self-same
argumentative logic as that of the secular terrorists with whom they are often contrasted.67
The second justification differs markedly from the first, in that it scorns any reference
to means–ends calculations, and justifies the deliberate killing of “infidel,” especially
American, civilians as a good in itself. Killing and terrorizing them, the argument goes, is a
form of reciprocal or retributive justice, and ought to be used for that purpose, and not just
as a means to achieve strategic military victories over the crusader–apostate enemy. In the
jihadi Salafi worldview, the case runs as follows: since “America” has murdered thousands
upon thousands of innocent Muslims, it is only right that a similar number of innocent
Americans should suffer the same fate. “We have the right to do to the infidels what they
have done to us,” says al-Zawahiri.68 Whether or not Americans are themselves innocent
of any actual aggression toward Muslims is beside the point, since justice demands that a
certain number of them be killed in order to achieve parity with the number of innocent
Muslims indiscriminately killed by Americans.69 This is Al Qaeda’s chief spokesman
Suleiman Abu Gheith:
The Americans have still not tasted from our hands what we have tasted from
theirs. The number of killed in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were
no more than fair exchange for the ones killed in the Al-’Amiriya shelter in Iraq,
and are but a tiny part of the exchange for those killed in Palestine, Somalia,
Sudan, the Philippines, Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. We have
not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill 4 million Americans—2
million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple
hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical



























have afflicted the Muslims because of the Americans’ chemical and biological
weapons.70
In his “Message to the American People,” broadcast on 28 October 2004, bin Laden is
similarly brazen in his use of the language of retribution and desert. Referring to the 9/11
attacks, he praises God, who “allowed the oppressed to take revenge on the oppressor.”71
Speaking of “the events that affected me personally,” he highlights Israel’s U.S.-assisted
invasion of Lebanon in 1982: this, he says, enraged him, and furnished him with “a strong
resolve to punish the oppressors.”72 Watching as the devastation in Lebanon unfolded—“I
cannot forget those unbearable scenes of blood and severed limbs, the corpses of women
and children strewn everywhere, houses destroyed along with their occupants and high-rise
buildings burying their residents”—it occurred to bin Laden that “we should punish the
oppressor in kind and destroy the towers of America, so that they could experience some of
what we had experienced.”73 The principle that informs bin Laden’s discourse here is the
ancient lex talionis: an eye for an eye.74
Terrorism, within this particular legitimatory framework, thus performs an expressive,
and not an instrumental, purpose: specifically, the expressive purpose of punishing aggres-
sors for past sins. Philosophically, this is what may be called an “intrinsicalist” position,75
since it constructs the killing of “infidels” as intrinsically or inherently valuable, as some-
thing worthy in itself or to be achieved for its own sake, regardless of consequences.
By learning and internalizing these two justifications, jihadis are able to overcome
their moral revulsion against killing the innocent, and thus clear the path for inhumanity.
They can murder and maim civilians and yet come to believe that they are acting perfectly
justly, in defense of something wonderful and glorious—the creed of Islam or the honor of
murdered Muslims.
Victim-Blaming and Dehumanization
Jihadi Salafis, as just noted, are able to neutralize the moral prohibition against the deliberate
killing of civilians by drawing on two distinct lines of argument: the first, grounded in a
utilitarian ethics, states that the killing in question is a practical necessity, while the second,
grounded in an absolutist ethics, states that it is righteous retribution for past crimes,
regardless of the moral guilt of the actual victims themselves. A third line of argument,
firmly anchored in the jihadi Salafi worldview, states that although the intentional killing
of innocent civilians cannot be justified,76 the civilian members of Western infidel regimes,
especially the United States, are not actually innocent, and hence can be killed at will.77
Although not themselves directly or materially responsible for the “crusader–Zionist”
aggression against Muslims, they are nonetheless active in supporting those who are, and so
are legitimate targets for attack.78 Here is how bin Laden frames the argument: by choosing
tyrannical leaders, American civilians “have given their consent to the incarceration of the
Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the children
of Iraq. This is why the American people are not innocent. The American people are active
members in all these crimes.”79 Hence: “We do not differentiate between military or civilian
. . . they are all targets.”80 In other words, by dint of their voting behavior, Americans are
indirectly blameworthy for the aggression of their elected masters, and cannot therefore
claim non-combatant immunity from defensive or retaliatory violence.
As can be seen, the rhetorical strategy at work in this particular argument is very
different from that which underpins the two modes of argument discussed in the previous



























aggressors, and not to unapologetically and self-righteously justify it, either as a means
of self-defense or as a mode of retributive punishment. Bin Laden, confusingly, routinely
adopts all three lines of argument, and hence simultaneously claims that terrorism is
warranted (as a tool for both self-defense and punishing transgressors), and that terrorism
is not warranted (since it menaces the innocent).
As already observed in the discussion of Bandura’s work, a particularly effective
weapon for neutralizing the resistance to killing civilians is to dehumanize them. Within the
jihadi Salafi worldview, the various enemies of Islam are defined not merely as “aggressors”
or “belligerents,” but as objects of utter revulsion—to the point whereby their humanoid
features are eclipsed almost entirely. They are defined not as individuals, but solely in
terms of a derogatory collective master status: they are, variously, “infidels,” “unbeliev-
ers,” “kufir,” “apostates,” “pagans,” “Satan-worshipers,” “godless,” and “slags.”81 These
identities serve to denigrate their bearers and transform them into “a lower species”;82 they
also serve to “ritually separate” them from “the legitimate order,”83 and to symbolically
distinguish them from the righteous Muslims, to whom they are seen as woefully inferior.
And, as inferiors—recall Qutb’s view that American’s are animal-like in their appetites
and sensibilities, and recall also bin Laden’s claim that brute violence is the only language
that “the infidels” can comprehend—they must be treated as such, without the dignity and
humanity naturally accorded to Muslims. As Herbert Kelman classically observed, once
dehumanized people are acutely vulnerable to the inhuman depredations of others.84
Denial of Personal Agency
Of the various neutralizations at work in the jihadi Salafi ideology, the denial of agency is
perhaps the most prominent. Virtually every aspect of the jihadi idiom is informed by the
idea that the jihad is not a choice, but a defining, unshakeable moral obligation, and that,
more importantly, it is directed by God. Jihadis do not, then, see themselves as voluntary
actors, but, on the contrary, as instruments of God’s will. For example, in bin Laden’s 1998
manifesto the following pronouncement occurs: “We—with God’s help— call on every
Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to
kill the Americans and plunder them of their possessions wherever and whenever they find
them.”85 By viewing their actions as divinely mandated, jihadis can carry out inhumanities
on a massive scale, secure in the belief that they are not personally culpable for them.86
They can kill, or contemplate killing, without a sense of guilt or moral doubt. As the main
character in John Updike’s novel Terrorist puts it, referring to his planned suicide mission,
“I have placed myself in God’s hand, and feel very serene. My own will, my own cravings,
are at rest.”87
Disregard of Consequences
One of the most striking aspects of the jihadi Salafi ideology is its blatant, almost casually
nihilistic, disregard for the value of human life: there are indeed few people whom jihadis
would not be able to justify or excuse killing. But there is another sense in which it scorns
the value of human life, and that is in respect to its radical elevation of the afterlife, in
comparison with which material human life seems trivial and insignificant.
Jihadis publicly claim to embrace and even desire death, unlike the infidels, whom they
stigmatize as pathetic and craven in their love for life. This is no mere boast on the part of
the jihadis, but is perfectly consistent with their view that human life is but a short preface



























and meaning. To view the world of human affairs in this way is to inure oneself not only
against a fear of death, but also the revulsion to killing, since if human life is seen as
trifling, so too is the act of extinguishing it. Jihadis, evidently, do not even feel guilty about
inadvertently killing innocent Muslims, as the properly righteous and God-fearing among
them will be destined for paradise in any case.88 Once the injurious consequences attached
to killing are trivialized, as they are here, killing can be carried out with relative ease.
The Neutralizations of Mohammed Bouyeri
Still calm, he made no serious attempt to escape. While he reloaded his gun, a
woman who happened by screamed: “You can’t do that!” “Yes, I can”, Bouyeri
replied, before strolling into a nearby park with several patrol cars rushing to
the scene.89
Although it would be an impossibly large task to empirically trace the presence of the
aforementioned neutralizations in the thinking of the murderers and martyrs of the global
Salafi jihad (i.e., those members of the movement who overcame the moral constraints
against killing), there is good reason to believe, on the basis of a number of well-documented
statements made by a not insignificant number of them, that at the time of their murderous
actions they had fully assimilated them. The case of Mohammed Bouyeri—the Moroccan-
Dutch jihadist who murdered Theo van Gogh—is an instructive one, not only because
Bouyeri fully internalized and espoused the neutralizations of the jihadi Salafi worldview,
but also because he self-consciously and brazenly acted upon them and murdered in the
name of Islam. The case also illuminates just how rapidly the jihadi Salafi worldview
has transcended its historical and geographical specificities and evolved into a global
free-floating conceptual resource, readily accessible from any Internet server, and how its
adoption among displaced and second-generation Muslims living in Western societies, far
from being a passive process, is effortful activity, indeed the product of a sustained and
active engagement.
First, let us consider Bouyeri’s actions. This is how Ian Buruma renders them in his
lucid and insightful book-length examination of Van Gogh’s murder and its fall-out:
It was the coolness of his manner, the composure of a person who knew
precisely what he was doing, that struck those who saw Mohammed Bouyeri,
a twenty-six-year-old Moroccan-Dutchman in a gray raincoat and prayer hat,
blast the filmmaker Theo van Gogh off his bicycle on a dreary morning in
Amsterdam. He shot him calmly in the stomach, and after the victim had
staggered to the other side of the street, shot him several more times, pulled out
a curved machete, and cut his throat—“as though slashing a tire”, according to
one witness.
Leaving the machete planted firmly in Van Gogh’s chest, he then pulled a
smaller knife from a bag, scribbled something on a piece of paper, folded the
letter neatly, and pinned it to the body with this second knife . . .
Bouyeri gave the corpse a few hard kicks and walked away, without hurry, easy
as could be, as though he had done nothing more dramatic than fillet a fish.90
Bouyeri’s actions, because of their elaborate cruelty and potent symbolism, cry out for



























to the rational choice theory of criminal behavior,91 offenders are fundamentally rational
decision-makers, and their offending can be explained in terms of the material benefits it
brings them. Criminal activity is thus the outcome of a process of reasoning, whereby the
offender calculates the prospective costs and benefits of committing a crime. From this
perspective, the offender, far from being “sick” or psychologically deficient, is simply an
ordinary person, and “employs the same sorts of cognitive strategies when contemplating
offending as the rest of us use when making other decisions.”92 Bouyeri, as Buruma makes
clear in his book, was indeed the apotheosis of ordinary, a person unremarkable in every
conceivable way. But his actions can scarcely be described as rational or instrumental,
since they were not designed to further Bouyeri’s material interests, nor were they intended
to strategically further a wider cause. Bouyeri’s chief intention was not to inspire fear or
to coerce anyone into doing anything; his intention, rather, was to punish Van Gogh—for
gratuitously insulting and dishonoring Islam and its Prophet. His actions, then, were not
instrumental, but expressive, and were carried out for their own sake. As Buruma puts it,
the slaughter of Van Gogh was a “principled murder”;93 and this is exactly how Bouyeri
himself characterized his actions: at his trial, he flatly said that he was divinely obligated
to “cut off the heads of all those who insult Allah and his prophet.”94
The question of why Bouyeri chose, or felt compelled, to murder Van Gogh is an
essential one, although it shall not be considered here. But whatever it was that caused him
to violently murder Van Gogh, Bouyeri’s actions were strongly premised on, and facilitated
by, a set of deep moral convictions and cognitive beliefs. What were they, or in what did
they consist?
Bouyeri’s radicalization into the cult of revolutionary jihadism was astonishingly rapid,
and took place over little more than one year. The path he followed is a familiar one: his old
habits—the beer drinking, the dope smoking, the chasing after girls—were discarded, and
gave way to “an increasingly moralistic outlook.”95 He refused to shake hands with women,
dropped old friends, and changed his appearance: “Not only had he grown a beard, but a
Moroccan djellaba and prayer hat were now part of his usual dress, instead of jeans.”96 By
the middle of 2003, he had retreated into the narrow world of a few like-minded friends—the
Hofstad Group, as Dutch intelligence would brand them. More crucially, for the purposes
of this article, he had also embraced the revolutionary doctrine of takfir, according to which
Muslims who depart from the true faith and fail to live by divine laws must be declared
apostates and subject to punishment by death.
In the report he wrote in his capacity as an expert witness in Bouyeri’s trial, Rudolph
Peters provides a fascinating insight into Bouyeri’s beliefs, and how they evolved into an
ideology that primed him for murderous violence. Bouyeri, Peters says, was convinced that
the world order was dominated by the forces of evil, personified by the West and especially
America, and that Islam was under threat of extinction at the hands of these forces. He also
believed that these forces could only be fought and defeated by means of violent struggle,
and that that struggle would precipitate the arrival of a worldwide Islamic order.97
Peters records that although Bouyeri and his circle did not have any direct organiza-
tional links with international jihadist groups, they were initially mentored by Abu Khaled
Redouan el-Issa, a former Syrian army officer who had applied for political asylum in
Germany. El-Issa, Peters notes, introduced them to the ideas of radical Islamism.98 Peters
specifically mentions that a rigorous examination of the seized documents stored on Bouy-
eri’s computer revealed that Bouyeri and the group “were ideologically heavily indebted
to the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb and the Indian/Pakistani Mawlana Abul A’la Mawdudi.”99
“Moreover,” he says, “large amounts of more recent Salafi material, especially from radical



























Peters quotes extensively from Bouyeri’s own writings, some of which had been posted
on the Internet. Of the various quotations cited by Peters, the following are especially
pertinent:
There are dark satanic forces that have sown their seed of evil everywhere in the
world. This seed has been sown in the Islamic world in the times of colonialism
and has since then taken root. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the
Islamic caliphate the enemies of Islam have been active in gradually carrying
out their plans aiming at the total destruction of Islam . . .101
The Islamic Ummah seems to be visited by a cancerous growth that has dis-
seminated all over the body. We are on the edge of an abyss and it seems that
it is only a matter of time before we smash ourselves up. We are a frustrated
nation betrayed by the so-called leaders of this Ummah, leaders who have sold
themselves as cheap whores to the West and allow the spirits and souls of
Muslim youth to be poisoned by the poison of unbelief.102
The death and torture of our brothers and sisters must be redeemed with your
own blood. You have become targets everywhere. . . . Life will become Hell for
you and you will not find rest until our brothers and sisters have it.103
In these quotes, one can easily discern the central themes of the jihadi Salafi worldview:
the theme of Islam under grave assault from evil forces both outside and within the Muslim
world; the theme of lost Islamic preeminence; and the theme of just retribution against
civilian unbelievers. Also discernable are two particularly potent neutralization tropes: the
idea of righteous violence and the idea of a dehumanized (“satanic”) enemy.
Whatever Bouyeri’s underlying motivations for wanting to kill Theo van Gogh, it is
clear that he would not have been able to go through with the act of killing him had he
not been able to justify or rationalize it in his own mind; and, as Peters’s analysis shows,
it was the jihadi Salafi ideology that provided him with the tools for accomplishing the
morally disengaged mindset that the killing required. Also evident from Peters’s analysis
is the willed nature of Bouyeri’s ideological conversion: the jihadi Salafi ideology was not
imposed on him by outside nefarious forces, but was a resource that he actively sought out
and selectively drew from for his own purposes.
Conclusion: Implications for Countering the Global Salafi Jihad
As this article has tried to show, the core ideas that form the jihadi Salafi ideology are not just
abstract theoretical propositions that exist at an intellectual distance from worldly affairs
but are in fact actively present in the world, and when put to use perform a range of social
actions, such as legitimizing, excusing, denying, demonizing, and ultimately, neutralizing.
They are not, to rephrase J. L. Austin’s classic formula,104 just all talk; they also do. Or, to
steal an expression from Quentin Tarantino’s fictional creation Mr. Blonde, they do not just
bark; they also bite.
The observation that the jihadi ideology functions as an instrument for inhumanity—
characteristically expressed in the phrase that it is an “armed doctrine”—is not in itself
particularly striking or original. What this article has tried to do is to give the observation
theoretical content, and conceptualize how, or in what ways, the ideology arms its users for
violence.
By way of conclusion, a few points will be made on the practical implications of the



























for thinking about the question of what is to be done about jihadist terrorism. The first,
which attracts strong support from those on the right of the political spectrum but also from
so-called hawkish liberals and leftists, argues that the response should focus on destroying
jihadi terror networks by capturing or killing their members, and variously advocates the
use of police work, surveillance, indefinite detention of suspects, interrogations, targeted
assassinations, and even preemptive military strikes to achieve this. Hence, this particular
scheme prioritizes the use of coercion, and even outright violence, as an instrument for
preventing further jihadist attacks on civilians.
The second master conceptual scheme, which draws solid backing from the so-called
doves on the left of the political spectrum, looks very different, and argues that the response
should focus on the grievances of the jihadists, in an effort to de-radicalize them or deprive
them of the wider support on which they depend. Tariq Ali’s insistence that the 7 July 2005
attacks in London were at root caused by Britain’s participation in the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq and that therefore “the real solution” for avoiding further such attacks is to end “the
occupation of Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine”105 is emblematic of this outlook. Hence,
this particular scheme advocates a nonviolent, conciliatory response, and prioritizes the
use of progressive foreign and domestic policy—engaging the Israeli–Palestinian dispute,
denying support for corrupt and oppressive regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere,
aiding the progressive and democratic forces throughout the world, and providing better
opportunities for alienated Muslims at home—as an instrument for removing the “root
causes” of jihadist attacks on civilians.
Although these two particular approaches have merits, their shortcomings are obvi-
ous. To be sure, a coercive response to terrorist actions can often be highly effective. The
bombing of Al Qaeda’s bases in Afghanistan, for example, dealt a devastating blow to
the organization, albeit a temporary one. Lawrence Wright remarks that two months af-
ter the 9/11 attacks the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which had given sanctuary
to bin Laden, “was routed, and the Al Qaeda fighters in Tora Bora were pummeled.”106
Wright says that although bin Laden and his chief lieutenants escaped death or capture,
“nearly eighty per cent of Al Qaeda’s members in Afghanistan were killed,” and adds
that at that point “Al Qaeda was essentially dead.”107 However, the effectiveness of a
coercive strategy is scarcely guaranteed and can indeed play directly into the hands of
the terrorists. In a perceptive article, published in 1986, Conor Cruise O’Brien writes
that “military action against countries harboring terrorists,” whatever “short-term advan-
tages may be derived” from it, carries a large price—“in increased international sym-
pathy for the ‘cause’ of the terrorists in question, and so in enhanced glamour and el-
bow room for them, all tending to legitimize and so facilitate future ‘counterattacks.’”108
Bandura similarly questions the long-term effectiveness of military strikes against ter-
rorists or their sponsors, and observes that the use of extreme countermeasures “often
spawns new terrorists and provides new justifications for violence.”109 “Indeed,” he writes,
“some terrorist activities are designed precisely to provoke curtailment of personal liber-
ties and other domestic repressive measures that might breed public disaffection with the
system.”110
The roots of terrorism are no doubt located in experiences of frustration and humiliation
and rage.111 These experiences can be found in every society, but they are especially
prevalent in those that are in severe social, economic, and political disarray. It is by no
means fanciful to think that terrorism would exert a less insistent presence in the world
today if these conditions were in some way alleviated. However, it is misguided to think
that all forms of terrorist activity are responses to actual injustice or societal disarray, and



























to markedly improve the situation of all the world’s oppressed, desperate, resentful, and
alienated populations.
An alternative or supplementary approach, and one that is strongly implicit in the argu-
ment of this article, is that terrorist activity, although it can never of course be eradicated,112
can nevertheless be seriously hindered by delegitimizing the various legitimatory symbolic
resources on which it draws. The idea behind this approach—scarcely original,113 but no
less persuasive for that—is that “any course of action will be inhibited to the degree that it
cannot be legitimized,” and “any principle that helps to legitimize a course of action will
therefore be among the enabling conditions of its occurrence.”114 From this it follows that
to inhibit jihadist activity it will be necessary to repudiate the ideology that legitimizes
it. This will not stop the jihadists, and those who aspire to emulate them, from feeling
aggrieved, humiliated, or disrespected. But it should hinder them from acting on these no
doubt deeply felt emotions, and thus limit their deadly potential. Before the emotions of
frustration and resentment can be outwardly expressed in acts of political violence, they
need to be interpreted and framed within a narrative that explains their genesis and how
they can be allayed.115 Challenging and delegitimizing the ideologies that serve to mobilize
toxic emotional states is thus an essential element in any practical strategy for dealing with
terrorism.
As this article has shown, the jihadi Salafi ideology neutralizes the binding force of
conventional moral constraints. An effective counter-jihadist policy must therefore work in
the other direction, and amplify the importance and gravity of the prohibition against killing
civilians. In other words, it must neutralize the neutralizations of the jihadis, and stress
the absolute value or sanctity of human life. Specifically, it must undermine the scriptural
basis of the jihadis legitimatory resources, and show how their radical interpretations fatally
deviate from the various Qur’anic rulings against the deliberate killing of innocents.116 As
an approach, then, it must speak directly to the jihadis and the wider Muslim world of
which they are a part, and engage them in their own terms. It must show that the actions
of the jihadis are a profound affront to the spirit of the Qur’an and of Islam in general.
Because of the nature of this task, and the general distrust in which the United States and
the West is held in many parts of the Muslim world, it is Muslims themselves who must
lead the challenge against the thinking of the jihadis.117 Western governments must give
them all the assistance that they can muster, but the challenge is only likely to succeed if it
is led by a credible force, with a deep understanding of Islam and the Islamic world.
Equally important, an effective counter-jihadist policy must expose and repudiate the
misperceptions, prejudices, and delusional aspects of the jihadi Salafi ideology, so as to
weaken its appeal for potential recruits.118 It must also highlight the terrible human costs,
borne largely by Muslims themselves, of jihadism, so as to de-glamorize its membership.
I do not for one moment believe that exposing the epistemic fallacies of the jihadi ideol-
ogy, or exposing the terrible suffering that the jihadis themselves have inflicted on other
Muslims, will necessarily dissuade people from joining the global Salafi jihad, still less
encourage existing members to leave it, since its appeal is to a large extent emotional, and
not intellectual. However misconceived, the jihadi Salafi ideology is deeply empowering
for those who come to believe in it. Not only does it furnish the believer with a strong sense
of identity and existential certainty; it also, more importantly, enables them to rationalize
personal failings and to justify violent retaliation against those who are perceived as re-
sponsible for them. However, it is just obviously false, racist even, to assume that existing
or potential jihadis are immune from appeals to reason or empirical evidence. When bin
Laden contemptuously says of the West that “violence is the only language it understands”



























dehumanizing characteristic to Muslims, and to assume that jihadis and potential jihadi
recruits are utterly beyond rational persuasion or second thinking. This point is strongly
supported by the existence of jihadi defectors119 and a large and expanding literature of
ex-jihadist personal testimony.120
Ultimately, the appeal of jihadism will fade only when the sources of frustration,
humiliation, and resentment in the Muslim world, and now increasingly in the West, begin
to dry up. I do not have the faintest idea how, causally, that can be made to happen, still
less whether in practice it could happen. In the meantime, the menace of jihadism is still
here in earnest, and is unlikely to go away any time soon. Jihadi terrorists must be tracked
down and brought to justice or killed. But, as I have suggested here on the basis of the
argument set out in this article, their ideology must also be countered, in order to hinder
current jihadis and disenchant potential ones.
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